Bertrand Villeneuve's publications

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Working papers

Ekeland, Ivar and Lautier, Delphine and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2016): "Hedging Pressure and Speculation in Commodity Markets".
Abstract: We propose a micro-founded equilibrium model to examine the interactions between the physical and the derivative markets of a commodity. It provides a unifying framework for the hedging pressure and the storage theories. The model comprises four types of traders: short- and long-hedgers, both of which operate on all markets; speculators who operate only on the futures market; and spot traders. We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions on the fundamentals of this economy for a rational expectation equilibrium to exist, and we show that it is unique. The model exhibits a remarkable variety of behaviors at equilibrium that we can use to analyze price relations for any commodity. The regimes are determined by basic characteristics of the commodity under consideration, as well as to present and expected supply conditions on the physical market. Further, through a comparative statics analysis, we precisely identify the losers and winners in the financialization of the commodity markets. Therefore, this paper clarifies the political economy of regulatory issues, like speculator's influence on prices.
BibTeX:
@unpublished{Ekeland,
author = {Ekeland, Ivar and Lautier, Delphine and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Hedging Pressure and Speculation in Commodity Markets},
year = {2016},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323560},

}
Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2016): "Negotiated Red Zones around Hazardous Plants".
Abstract: The industrialists are liable for any damage they cause to neighboring households. Consequently, households do not have to pay for the risk they create by locating in exposed areas. To contain their liabilities, the firm can purchase or rent land, establishing an exclusion zone, also called a red zone. This paper studies the negotiations of red zones in urban areas exposed to industrial disasters. We compare typical scenarios regarding the distribution of bargaining power between the firm and the city. Using a microeconomic model, we explain how red zones are revised as technology, climate, or demography change, and we show how and why responses are neatly distinct across scenarios. Further, we give and explain the conditions for industrial sanctuaries (as the population grows) and city cores (as the risk grows).
BibTeX:
@unpublished{Grislain-Letremy2016,
author = {Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Negotiated Red Zones around Hazardous Plants},
year = {2016},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446880},

}
Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2016): "Natural Disasters, Land-Use, and Insurance".
Abstract: This paper addresses the urbanization of areas exposed to natural disasters and studies its dependency on land-use and insurance policies. The risk-map paradox that we describe explains why an insurance system with simplistic maps and tariffs is the rule. Indeed, in practice we observe simple policies, consisting of a prohibited red zone and a zone without insurance tariff differentiation. We show that they implement the optimal land-use in specific cases. Even if there are fixed damages per dwelling, the red-zone policy is relatively efficient. In a central proposition, we detail the effects redefining the optimal red zone as the climate or the population changes. We use this analysis to expose and comment plausible cases in which, as the population grows, the red zone shrinks, the red zone grows, and the red zone shrinks and then grows.
BibTeX:
@unpublished{Grislain-Letremy2016a,
author = {Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Natural Disasters, Land-Use, and Insurance},
year = {2016},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2603700},

}

Articles

Durand-Viel, Laure and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2016): "Strategic Capacity Investment under Hold-up Threats: The Role of Contract Length and Width". The Manchester School. Vol. 84 (3) , pp. 313-339.
Abstract: We analyze the impact of the length of incomplete contracts on investment and surplus sharing. In the bilateral relationship explored, the seller controls the input and the buyer invests. With two-part tariffs, the length of the contract is irrelevant: the surplus is maximal and goes to the seller. In linear contracts, the seller prefers the shortest contract and the buyer the longest one. Further, the commitment period concentrates the incentives, whereas afterwards there is rent extraction. The socially efficient contract is as short as possible; yet, long contracts can be promoted because of the surplus they allocate to the buyer.
BibTeX:
@article{Durand-Viel2016,
author = {Durand-Viel, Laure and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Strategic Capacity Investment under Hold-up Threats: The Role of Contract Length and Width},
journal = {The Manchester School},
year = {2016},
volume = {84},
number = {3},
pages = {313-339},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/manc.12100},
doi = {10.1111/manc.12100},

}
Aïd, René and Federico, Salvatore and Pham, Huyên and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2015): "Explicit Investment Rules with Time-to-Build and Uncertainty". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Vol. 51 , pp. 240-256. No number nor issue.
Abstract: We establish explicit socially optimal rules for an irreversible investment decision with time-to-build and uncertainty. Assuming a price sensitive demand function with a random intercept, we provide comparative statics and economic interpretations for three models of demand (arithmetic Brownian, geometric Brownian, and the Cox–Ingersoll–Ross). Committed capacity, that is, the installed capacity plus the investment in the pipeline, must never drop below the best predictor of future demand, minus two biases. The discounting bias takes into account the fact that investment is paid upfront for future use; the precautionary bias multiplies a type of risk aversion index by the local volatility. Relying on the analytical forms, we discuss in detail the economic effects. For example, the impact of volatility on the optimal investment is negligible in some cases. It vanishes in the CIR model for long delays, and in the GBM model for high discount rates.
BibTeX:
@article{Aid2015,
author = {Aïd, René and Federico, Salvatore and Pham, Huyên and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Explicit Investment Rules with Time-to-Build and Uncertainty},
journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control},
year = {2015},
volume = {51},
pages = {240-256},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188914002875},
doi = {10.1016/j.jedc.2014.10.010},

}
Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2015): "Prévention des catastrophes naturelles~: viser le long terme sans attendre". Revue d'Économie Financière. Vol. 117 , pp. 127-136.
Abstract: L'urbanisation des zones exposées aux risques naturels est importante et ira croissant. L'analyse économique propose plusieurs outils pour maîtriser ce phénomène : une tarification de l'assurance ajustée au risque, et un zonage et des normes de construction dans les zones exposées. Ces deux outils sont théoriquement équivalents, mais leurs applications respectives soulèvent différentes difficultés, et les incitations financières ont été excessivement réduites en France. Dans les deux cas, une plus grande rigueur rencontrera des oppositions, car elle touchera plus spécifiquement certains lieux. Nous discutons cette difficile gestion de l'existant et expliquons que les droits du grand-père ou les expropriations ne peuvent être considérés comme des réponses durables.
BibTeX:
@article{Grislain-Letremy2015,
author = {Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Prévention des catastrophes naturelles~: viser le long terme sans attendre},
journal = {Revue d'Économie Financière},
year = {2015},
volume = {117},
pages = {127-136},
url = {http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-financiere-2015-1-page-127.htm},
doi = {10.3917/ecofi.117.0127},

}
Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2014): "Commodity Storage with Durable Shocks: a Simple Markovian Model". Mathematics and Financial Economics. Vol. 8 (2) , pp. 169-192.
Abstract: We model an economy that alternates randomly between abundance and scarcity episodes. We characterize in detail the structure of the Markovian competitive equilibrium. Accumulation and drainage of stocks are the main focuses. Economically appealing comparative statics results are proved. We also characterize the stationary distribution of states. We extend the model to discuss price stabilization policies, injection and release costs, and limited storage capacity. Overall, the analysis delineates the notion of ``flexible economy.''
BibTeX:
@article{Creti2013,
author = {Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Commodity Storage with Durable Shocks: a Simple Markovian Model},
journal = {Mathematics and Financial Economics},
year = {2014},
volume = {8},
number = {2},
pages = {169-192},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11579-013-0108-7},
doi = {10.1007/s11579-013-0108-7},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2014): "Mortgage Life Insurance: a Rationale for a Time Limit in Switching Rights". Mathematics and Financial Economics. Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 473-487.
Abstract: I examine competition in the sector of mortgage life insurance, in particular the periodic switching right (PSR), by which the borrower can change his insurer once every period (say, every year). The PSR is likely to have pro competitive effects (lower premium), but by the same move, to lead to excessive segmentation. The main theoretical prediction of the PSR is that, in equilibrium, everyone will pay every year a premium reflecting his current risk, meaning that the risk of future risk evolution is not covered. This destruction of insurance is appreciated negatively by consumers. The trade-off is between, on the one hand, a lower price for insurance, and on the other hand, a lower quality of insurance. I simulate the cost of the PSR and find about 5--15 % of the total insurance cost. This order of magnitude is slightly smaller than the benefit one can expect from increased competition. All in all, a switching right limited in time would bring the benefits of competition and avoid most of the cost of segmentation.
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2014,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Mortgage Life Insurance: a Rationale for a Time Limit in Switching Rights},
journal = {Mathematics and Financial Economics},
year = {2014},
volume = {8},
number = {4},
pages = {473-487},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11579-014-0124-2},
doi = {10.1007/s11579-014-0124-2},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua (2013): "Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action". Annals of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 109/110 , pp. 179-201. [GENES, ADRES].
Abstract: We analyze the trade-off faced by authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is modeled as (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time, and (2) a sharing of scarce sites or any other non-reproducible asset. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms durably differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here is the policy that recognizes the fact that, under certain circumstances, helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus. Nous analysons les enjeux d'une réforme structurelle radicale unique dans un secteur capitalistique. Une structure est modélisée par (1) un partage du capital productif à un moment donné et (2) un partage de sites rares ou de tout autre actif non-reproductible. Ces deux dimensions illustrent l'importance d'une théorie dynamique dans laquelle les concurrents diffèrent sur plusieurs plans. Bien que l'égalisation des conditions initiales et des droits soit théoriquement optimale, des contraintes réalistes obligent à des solutions de second rang. La discrimination positive est la politique qui reconnaît que, sous certaines conditions, aider les plus désavantagés est le plus avantageux socialement.
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2013,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua},
title = {Industry Restructuring: A Case for Affirmative Action},
journal = {Annals of Economics and Statistics},
publisher = {[GENES, ADRES]},
year = {2013},
volume = {109/110},
pages = {179-201},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23646431},
doi = {10.2307/23646431},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2013): "Stratégie optimale de stockage de déchets radioactifs à vie longue sous contrainte de capacité". Revue Économique. Vol. 64 (4) , pp. 635-649. Sciences Po University Press.
Abstract: L'article modélise un programme de gestion de déchets nucléaires à haute activité. La physique du refroidissement permet d'entreposer un certain temps un colis chaud afin d'économiser le volume de stockage définitif : en effet, les colis plus froids peuvent être davantage serrés. La durée optimale théorique d'entreposage sans contrainte est caractérisée. Les diverses contraintes (contrainte sur la capacité de stockage, contrainte sur la durée d'entreposage, contrainte sur la capacité d'entreposage) sont envisagées. Elles conduisent à des traitements très différenciés selon les millésimes. The paper models a program of high-activity nuclear-waste management. The physics of cooling incites to store hot waste for a while to spare scarce disposal volume: indeed, colder parcels may be put in tighter conditions. The optimal unconstrained duration of storage is characterized. Various constraints (on disposal capacity, on the length of storage, on storage capacity) are considered. They all lead to contrasted strategies depending on vintage.
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2013a,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Stratégie optimale de stockage de déchets radioactifs à vie longue sous contrainte de capacité},
journal = {Revue Économique},
publisher = {Sciences Po University Press},
year = {2013},
volume = {64},
number = {4},
pages = {635-649},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23484840},
doi = {10.2307/23484840},

}
Bommier, Antoine and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2012): "Risk Aversion and the Value of Risk to Life". Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol. 79 (1) , pp. 77-104. Blackwell Publishing Inc.
Abstract: The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari’s (1965) model, which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of preferences that are not necessarily additively separable. The enlargement we propose is relevant for the evaluation of life-saving programs: current practice, we estimate, puts too little weight on mortality risk reduction of the young. Our correction exceeds in magnitude that introduced by the switch from the notion of number of lives saved to the notion of years of life saved.
BibTeX:
@article{Bommier2012,
author = {Bommier, Antoine and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Risk Aversion and the Value of Risk to Life},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Insurance},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Inc},
year = {2012},
volume = {79},
number = {1},
pages = {77-104},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01390.x},
doi = {10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01390.x},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2012): "La précarité socialement construite : quelques remarques sur les effets indésirables de politiques fiscales et sociales bien intentionnées". Passages. Vol. 172
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2012,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {La précarité socialement construite : quelques remarques sur les effets indésirables de politiques fiscales et sociales bien intentionnées},
journal = {Passages},
year = {2012},
volume = {172},
url = {https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2n5zfPCcJlfNDNpZ0x0dHA4YzQ/edit},

}
Chaton, Corinne and Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2009): "Storage and Security of Supply in the Medium Run". Resource and Energy Economics. Vol. 31 (1) , pp. 24 - 38.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of private storage in a market for a commodity (e.g. natural gas) whose supply is subject to the threat of an irreversible disruption. We focus on the medium term in which seasonality of demand and exhaustibility can be neglected. We characterize the price and inventory dynamics (accumulation, drainage and limit stocks) in a competitive equilibrium with rational expectations. We show the robustness of our results to alternative scenarios in which either a disruption has finite duration or the crisis is foreseen. During the crisis consumers may put pressure on the Government to intervene, but too severe antispeculative measures would inefficiently discourage storage. Practical solutions to this dilemma cause welfare losses that we characterize and quantify.
BibTeX:
@article{Chaton2009,
author = {Chaton, Corinne and Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Storage and Security of Supply in the Medium Run},
journal = {Resource and Energy Economics},
year = {2009},
volume = {31},
number = {1},
pages = {24 - 38},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092876550800033X},
doi = {10.1016/j.reseneeco.2008.10.004},

}
Chaton, Corinne and Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2008): "Some Economics of Seasonal Gas Storage". Energy Policy. Vol. 36 (11) , pp. 4235-4246.
Abstract: We propose a model of seasonal gas markets which is flexible enough to include supply and demand shocks while also considering exhaustibility. The relative performances of alternative policies based on price caps and associated measures or tariffs are discussed. We illustrate with structural estimates on US data how this theory can be used to give insights into the intertemporal incidence of policy instruments.
BibTeX:
@article{Chaton2008,
author = {Chaton, Corinne and Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Some Economics of Seasonal Gas Storage},
journal = {Energy Policy},
year = {2008},
volume = {36},
number = {11},
pages = {4235-4246},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421508003893},
doi = {10.1016/j.enpol.2008.07.034},

}
Barigozzi, Francesca and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2006): "The Signaling Effect of Tax Policy". Journal of Public Economic Theory. Vol. 8 (4) , pp. 611-630. Blackwell Publishing Inc.
Abstract: The paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed than the government on the effect of their consumption. The policy making process is analyzed as a game in which the government wants to influence consumers' behaviors through tax policy, consumers being rational and Bayesian. The marginal cost of public funds induces the government to provide biased information to pursue budgetary objectives. We analyze the tax distortion that is required for credibility.
BibTeX:
@article{Barigozzi2006,
author = {Barigozzi, Francesca and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {The Signaling Effect of Tax Policy},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Inc},
year = {2006},
volume = {8},
number = {4},
pages = {611-630},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00281.x},
doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00281.x},

}
Chassagnon, Arnold and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2005): "Optimal Risk-sharing under Adverse Selection and Imperfect Risk Perception". Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Économique. Vol. 38 (3) , pp. 955-978. Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc..
Abstract: The present paper thoroughly explores second-best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection. We start with a natural extension of the classical model, assuming less than perfect risk perception. We characterize the constraints on efficient redistribution, and we summarize the incidence of incentives on the economy with the notions of weak and strong adverse selection. Finally, we show in what sense improving risk perception enhances welfare.
BibTeX:
@article{Chassagnon2005,
author = {Chassagnon, Arnold and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Optimal Risk-sharing under Adverse Selection and Imperfect Risk Perception},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Économique},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Ltd/Inc.},
year = {2005},
volume = {38},
number = {3},
pages = {955-978},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00311.x},
doi = {10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00311.x},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2005): "Competition between Insurers with Superior Information". European Economic Review. Vol. 49 (2) , pp. 321-340.
Abstract: We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently profitable. We also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms. Our analysis of the “contrary of adverse selection” (competition between principals with common value and exclusivity) is suitable for other markets (lawyers, doctors, mechanics, etc.).
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2005,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Competition between Insurers with Superior Information},
journal = {European Economic Review},
year = {2005},
volume = {49},
number = {2},
pages = {321-340},
url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292103000473},
doi = {10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00047-3},

}
Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2004): "Longterm Contracts and Take-or-Pay Clauses in Natural Gas Markets". Energy Studies Review. Vol. 13 , pp. 75-94.
Abstract: This paper surveys the existing theoretical and empirical research on long term contracts inspired by the American experience. We analyze the role of take-or-pay clauses and price indexation rules, questioning whether regulation distorts optimal contract duration. The models we summarize allows us to discuss the economic fundamentals of the ED provisions on long-term contracts in the natural gas industry, pointing out that the ED position on long-term contracting seems to mix up contract duration and flexibility.
BibTeX:
@article{Creti2004,
author = {Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Longterm Contracts and Take-or-Pay Clauses in Natural Gas Markets},
journal = {Energy Studies Review},
year = {2004},
volume = {13},
pages = {75-94},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/esr.v13i1.466},
doi = {10.15173/esr.v13i1.466},

}
Jeleva, Meglena and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2004): "Insurance Contracts with Imprecise Probabilities and Adverse Selection". Economic Theory. Vol. 23 (4) , pp. 777-794.
Abstract: This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered.
BibTeX:
@article{Jeleva2004,
author = {Jeleva, Meglena and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Insurance Contracts with Imprecise Probabilities and Adverse Selection},
journal = {Economic Theory},
year = {2004},
volume = {23},
number = {4},
pages = {777-794},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0396-x},
doi = {10.1007/s00199-003-0396-x},

}
Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003): "Politique énergétique : aspects stratégiques de la question des approvisionnements". Économie et Prévision. Vol. 158 , pp. 73-88.
Abstract: Nous traitons des fondements de la fiscalité de l’énergie dans une perspective d’optimisation des approvisionnements auprès de fournisseurs étrangers à la Communauté européenne. Notre modèle permet de distinguer et d’évaluer trois termes formant la taxe optimale : le terme strictement budgétaire, le terme environnemental et le terme stratégique. Les valeurs dépendent de données technologiques (production) et des valeurs des usages (consommation), mais également du rapport de force entre la Communauté et ses fournisseurs. Nous pouvons, à partir des discussions fondées sur les scénarios proposés, suggérer des améliorations de la politique énergétique. Energy Policy: Strategic Aspects of the Supply Issue This article treats energy taxation principles in the light of the need to optimise supply by non-EU suppliers. Our model distinguishes and evaluates the three terms of an optimum tax: budget, environment and strategy. Their values depend on technological data (output) and habits (consumption) as well as the balance of power between the Community and its suppliers. The proposed scenarios can be used to discuss and suggest improvements in the energy policy.
BibTeX:
@article{Creti2003,
author = {Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Politique énergétique : aspects stratégiques de la question des approvisionnements},
journal = {Économie et Prévision},
year = {2003},
volume = {158},
pages = {73-88},
url = {www.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision-2003-2-page-73.htm},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003): "Mandatory Pensions and the Intensity of Adverse Selection in Life Insurance Markets". Journal of Risk and Insurance. Vol. 70 (3) , pp. 527-548. Blackwell Publishing.
Abstract: This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection, whether a market is active or inactive, and social welfare are analyzed.
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2003,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Mandatory Pensions and the Intensity of Adverse Selection in Life Insurance Markets},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Insurance},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishing},
year = {2003},
volume = {70},
number = {3},
pages = {527-548},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1539-6975.t01-1-00063},
doi = {10.1111/1539-6975.t01-1-00063},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003): "Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance". Annales d'Économie et de Statistique. Vol. 69 , pp. 119-142. [GENES, ADRES].
Abstract: Le modèle standard de concurrence avec antisélection en assurance (Rothschild et Stiglitz) suppose que les types ne diffèrent que par leur probabilité d'accident. Supposant qu'ils puissent aussi différer par leur attitude face au risque, nous mettons en évidence des configurations inhabituelles: des équilibres multiples; des profits strictement positifs; de l'assurance aléatoire. Nous caractérisons les différents régimes d'équilibre possibles et analysons les paramètres qui les déterminent. /// ln the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, assuming differences in risk aversions may lead to unusual equilibrium configurations like multiple equilibria, equilibrium positive profits, or random contracts. We characterize the various types of equilibria and give results on the determinants of the equilibrium regime. We conclude with a few remarks on classical equilibrium concepts in insurance economics, and we suggest policy implications.
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2003a,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance},
journal = {Annales d'Économie et de Statistique},
publisher = {[GENES, ADRES]},
year = {2003},
volume = {69},
pages = {119-142},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076366},
doi = {10.2307/20076366},

}
Koehl, Pierre-François and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2002): "Compensation for What? An Analysis of Insurance Strategies for Repairable Assets". Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. Vol. 25 (1) , pp. 47-64.
Abstract: We define a repairable asset as an irreplaceable commodity whose quality is at risk, but can be partly restored at a cost. Examples are houses, automobiles and, especially, health, for which standard monetary approaches are oversimplified. To optimize the value of insurance, the insurer and the insured have to agree upon repair strategies (when to fix the asset and how much) and compensation rules (how much money to receive for other goods). We clarify the role of the consumer's preferences in the properties of the contract, and we highlight the relationship between repair strategies and the super- or submodular structure of the repair technology.
BibTeX:
@article{Koehl2002,
author = {Koehl, Pierre-François and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Compensation for What? An Analysis of Insurance Strategies for Repairable Assets},
journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
year = {2002},
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {47-64},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016367314043},
doi = {10.1023/A:1016367314043},

}
Koehl, Pierre-François and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2001): "Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple-Risk Insurance Markets". International Economic Review. Vol. 42 (1) , pp. 245-266. Blackwell Publishers Inc.
Abstract: We study imperfect competition between insurers in a multiple-risk environment. In the absence of asymmetric information, equilibria are efficient, and we determine the degrees of specialization under which the specialized insurers are able or unable to capture the surplus. We show in contrast that under adverse selection, specialization systematically prevents second-best efficiency. Concluding on the role of our notions of strategic complementarity/substituability on the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness of the allocation, we give indications on the desirable structure of the insurance industry.
BibTeX:
@article{Koehl2001,
author = {Koehl, Pierre-François and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple-Risk Insurance Markets},
journal = {International Economic Review},
publisher = {Blackwell Publishers Inc},
year = {2001},
volume = {42},
number = {1},
pages = {245-266},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00109},
doi = {10.1111/1468-2354.00109},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2000): "The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed". Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory. Vol. 25 (1) , pp. 65-79.
Abstract: This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information.
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve2000,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed},
journal = {Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory},
year = {2000},
volume = {25},
number = {1},
pages = {65-79},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008749524517},
doi = {10.1023/A:1008749524517},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (1998): "Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques". Revue Économique. Vol. 49 (3) , pp. 821-829. Sciences Po University Press.
Abstract: Nous modélisons une situation où le monopole d'assurance sait mieux estimer les risques que les assurés eux-mêmes. Nous donnons une caractérisation complète des équilibres de ce jeu de signaux multidimensionnels. Nous les comparons avec les prédictions des modèles classiques d'antisélection. Nous faisons une analyse de la valeur de l'information lorsque la discrimination est permise. /// We model a situation where a monopolistic insurer is better at evaluating riskiness than the policyholders. We characterize the equilibria of the corresponding multidimensional signaling game. We compare the predictions with those of adverse selection models. We give results on the value of information when discrimination is allowed.
BibTeX:
@article{Villeneuve1998,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques},
journal = {Revue Économique},
publisher = {Sciences Po University Press},
year = {1998},
volume = {49},
number = {3},
pages = {821-829},
url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3502812},
doi = {10.2307/3502812},

}
Blanchet, Didier and Villeneuve, Bertrand (1997): "Que reste-t-il du débat repartition-capitalisation ?". Revue d'Économie Financière. Vol. 40 , pp. 157-174.
Abstract: Le débat répartition-capitalisation a été au centre des réflexions sur la retraite au cours des dernières années, et cet article retrace quelques-uns de ses aspects les plus marquants. Il revient d'abord sur le constat démographique initial: quelle est la nature exacte des contraintes que la démographie fait peser sur les retraites, et le développement de la capitalisation est-il une bonne ou mauvaise réponse à ces contraintes ? Quels seraient par ailleurs les avantages économiques de ce développement ? Sur toutes ces questions, il semble qu'on ait convergé vers une position moyenne selon laquelle la capitalisation n'est en rien une panacée mais constitue un moyen parmi d'autres de se prémunir contre les incertitudes démographiques et économiques du siècle prochaine. Dans ces conditions, le débat a basculé vers la question des modalités de mise en place de cette capitalisation, et notamment du dosage à trouver entre contrôle et liberté des acteurs, aussi bien du côté des bénéficiaires que des gestionnaires du système. On examine cet arbitrage à propos de trois grandes questions : celle du partage individuel /collectif, celle des modalités de liquidation des retraites capitalisées, celle du statut des gestionnaires.
BibTeX:
@article{Blanchet1997,
author = {Blanchet, Didier and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {Que reste-t-il du débat repartition-capitalisation ?},
journal = {Revue d'Économie Financière},
year = {1997},
volume = {40},
pages = {157-174},
url = {https://www.aef.asso.fr/telecharger-article/709-les-syst-mes-de-retraite-structure-s-d-fis-et-perspectives/pdf},
doi = {https://www.aef.asso.fr/publications/revue-d-economie-financiere/40-les-syst-egrave-mes-de-retraite-structure-s-d-eacute-fis-et-perspectives/709-les-syst-mes-de-retraite-structure-s-d-fis-et-perspectives},

}

Chapters in books

Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2013): "Risque, assurance et valeur foncière". In Les risques majeurs et l'action publique. Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Lahidji, Reza and Mongin, Philippe (ed.). Chapter C Vol. 105 , pp. 211-226. Conseil d'analyse économique.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Grislain-Letremy2013,
author = {Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
editor = {Grislain-Letrémy, Céline and Lahidji, Reza and Mongin, Philippe},
title = {Risque, assurance et valeur foncière},
booktitle = {Les risques majeurs et l'action publique},
chapter = {C},
publisher = {Conseil d'analyse économique},
year = {2013},
volume = {105},
pages = {211-226},
url = {http://www.cae-eco.fr/IMG/pdf/105.pdf},

}
Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2009): "Gas Storage and Security of Supply". In The Economics of Natural Gas Storage. Cretì, Anna (ed.). Chapter 5 , pp. 97-128. Springer.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Creti2009,
author = {Cretì, Anna and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
editor = {Cretì, Anna},
title = {Gas Storage and Security of Supply},
booktitle = {The Economics of Natural Gas Storage},
chapter = {5},
publisher = {Springer},
year = {2009},
pages = {97-128},
url = {http://www.springer.com/fr/book/9783540794066},
doi = {https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2n5zfPCcJlfMmE5OTQ4NzctZTVkZS00N2ExLWE5ZDgtMDNhMjEzZTM3NzAx/edit?usp=sharing},

}
Barigozzi, Francesca and Villeneuve, Bertrand (2003): ""Il fumo nuoce gravemente alla salute": la credibilità delle campagne informative". In Intervento pubblico e architettura dei mercati. Piacentino, Diego and Sobbrio, Giuseppe (ed.). Chapter 9 , pp. 219-238. Franco Angeli, Milano.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Barigozzi,
author = {Barigozzi, Francesca and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
editor = {Piacentino, Diego and Sobbrio, Giuseppe},
title = {"Il fumo nuoce gravemente alla salute": la credibilità delle campagne informative},
booktitle = {Intervento pubblico e architettura dei mercati},
chapter = {9},
publisher = {Franco Angeli, Milano},
year = {2003},
pages = {219-238},

}
Villeneuve, Bertrand (2000): "Life Insurance". In Handbook of Insurance. Georges Dionne (ed.). Chapter 27 , pp. 901-932. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Abstract: This survey reviews the micro-economic foundations of the analysis of life insurance markets. The first part outlines a simple theory of insurance
needs based on the life-cycle hypothesis. The second part builds on contract theory to expose the main issues in life insurance design within a unified framework. We investigate how much flexibility is desirable. Flexibility is needed to accommodate changing tastes and objectives, but it also gives way to opportunistic behaviors from the part of the insurers and the insured. Many typical features of actual life insurance contracts can be considered the equilibrium outcome of this trade-off.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Villeneuve2000a,
author = {Villeneuve, Bertrand},
editor = {Georges Dionne},
title = {Life Insurance},
booktitle = {Handbook of Insurance},
chapter = {27},
publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
year = {2000},
pages = {901-932},
url = {http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-010-0642-2_27},

}
Sicsic, Pierre and Villeneuve, Bertrand (1993): "L'Afflux de l'or en France de 1928 à 1934". In Du Franc Poincaré à l'Ecu. (ed.). Chapter 2 , pp. 21-55. Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière, Paris.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Sicsic1993,
author = {Sicsic, Pierre and Villeneuve, Bertrand},
title = {L'Afflux de l'or en France de 1928 à 1934},
booktitle = {Du Franc Poincaré à l'Ecu},
chapter = {2},
publisher = {Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière, Paris},
year = {1993},
pages = {21-55},

}
Created by JabRef on 12/11/2016.